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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintifl7Appellee
CaseNo.990846-CA

vs.
STEPHEN E. RUSSELL,
Defendant/Appellant

Case Priority: 2 (Defendant Not Incarcerated)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal
from a pretrial rulling and jury verdict entered in
The Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, Murray Department
Hon. Joseph C. Fratto, presiding

Attorney for Appellee:
Sirena M. Wissler
Salt Lake County Depurty Attorney
2001 South State Street, S3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Tel: (801) 468-3422

Attorney for Appellant:
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Michael L. Humiston
23 West Center Street
P.O. Box 486
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Heber City, UT 84032 the Court
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this matter is pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3, which states in pertinent part:
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction of afirstdegree or capital felony.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial judge err in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial? This
is a mixed question of law and feet. The standard of review is clear error as to the fects and
correctness as to the law, and the appellate court may grant considerable deference to the trial courts
application of the law to the fects. Utah Department of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry.
945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code (1953, as amended), Sections 76-2-401(1):
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based
on the conduct. The defense ofjustification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons of property under the
circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of this part;
Utah Code (1953, as amended), Sections 76-2-402(1 )(pertinent part):
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to
the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself
or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
Amendment VI, United States Constitution (pertinent part):
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . .
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution (pertinent part):

2
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about October 6,1997, Appellant Steve Russell was involved in an incident in which
a Mr. Mavadatt and Mr. Russell both called the Salt Lake County Sheriffs department alleging an
assault. Although two officers came to the scene, no citations were issued at that time. No
information wasfileduntil January 13,1998. Because Mr. Russell did not know until three months
after thefeetthat he was even going to be charged, the opportunity to locate witnesses critical to his
defense was completely lost. Numerous delays then followed, none ofwhich were attributable to Mr.
Russell, and all of which were requested or instigated by the State. Trial was not held until June 17,
1999, over 20 months after the alleged incident. By that time Mr. Russell could not locate any
defense witnesses. A pre-trial motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was timely made prior to
trial, and was renewed at trial. Mr. Russell was acquitted by a jury of Assault with Injury, a Class A
Misdemeanor, but convicted of simple Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor. Sentencing was entered on
August 26, 1999 at which time the motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was renewed. The
motion was denied all three times that it was made.
- -SUMMARYT5F ARGUMENTS
Over 3 months elapsed between the alleged incident and thefilingof an information, and over
20 months elapsed between the time of the alleged incident and trial in the matter. As a result of this
delay, Appellant was denied the ability to locate crucial defense witnesses and was thus prejudiced
in is ability to defend himself at trial. Appellant was thus denied a speedy trial in violation ofhis rights
under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
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Constitution.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL
The right to a speedy andpublic trial is guaranteed under the Vlth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution. In construing Article I,
Section 12, of the Utah Constitution, the same analysis is applied as is used in applying the federal
Constitution. State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). In determining whether the
Appellant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court must consider four factors. Those
factors are (1) Length of the delay; (2) Reason for the delay; (3) Whether the Appellant effectively
asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (4) Whether the Appellant was prejudiced by the delay.
Barkerv. Winso. 407 U.S. 514,92 S.Ct. 2182,33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), State v. Woodland 945 P.2d
665, 669 (Utah 1997).
A. Length of Delay
First is the length of the delay. In the instant case, the State failed to bring Mr. Russell to trial
for over 20 months. In Barker the United States Supreme Court indicated that the length of delay that
can be tolerated must be proportional to the complexity of the case. 407 U.S. at 530-31. Simple
assault, a class B misdemeanor, is not a complex matter. The State's discovery was completed early
in the process, and bears this out. Nevertheless, the State waited three months before evenfilingan
information, three months in which Mr. Russell could have located the bystanders who witnessed the
original incident. "The length of the delay is the triggering mechanism" for the Court to determine
if the Appellant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. 407 U.S. at 531. A 20-month delay from

4
the time of the alleged incident until trial certainly creates a presunqrtion of prejudice.
B. Reason for Delay
There are no facts in the record as to why there was a 3-month delayfromthe date of the
incident until the first information was filed. Nor is there any indication why arraignment on the
original information was not held until May 1, 1998.
At thefirstscheduled trial setting in Justice Court, the State's witnessesfoiledto appear. The
Court ordered another pretrial conference and also ordered the State to have all their witnesses
present. At the second pretrial conference, the victimfoiledto appear as well as Dr. Vogel. The State
again requested a continuance for a pretrial conference. On September 23, 1998, almost one year
from the alleged incident, the State's witnesses againfoiledto appear and the State, without stating
a reason, moved for dismissal without prejudice to file in the District Court as a Class A charge of
Assault with Injury.
When witnesses have legitimate reasons that make them unavailable for trial, delay on the part
of the State can be excused in some cases. State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204,208 (UtApp. 1991). In this
case, no such excuse was offered. The witnesses simplyfoiledto appear, repeatedly.
The State cannot allege in this case that Mr. Russell caused any of the delays. Indeed, the
major failure in most speedy trial appeals is when the delay is caused by the defendant. State v. Hovt
806 P.2d 204,208 (UtApp. 1991), Statev.KnilL 656 P.2d 1026,1029 (Utah 1982), State v. Snvder.
932 P.2d 120, 130 (Ut.App. 1997). Clearly, that is not the case here. The State re-filed the
information within three weeks of the Justice Court's order of dismissal, but never summoned Mr.
Russell by either mail or service. The State has Mr. Russell's address and phone number. The State
exercised no diligence whatsoever on this case, and Mr. Russell only learned that charges had been
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re-filed when he made inquiry in April, 1999. Mr. Russell appeared at every hearing prepared for trial
as best he could under the circumstances. The fact that all delays in this matter were caused by the
State weights heavily against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
C. Assertion of Right
The record is clear that Mr. Russell amply asserted his right to a speedy trial throughout the
proceedings, and the matter was not only heard at a hearing prior to trial but was again renewed at
the commencement of trial. Mr. Russell has clearly met his obligation in asserting his rights and
preserving the issue for appeal. Barker, 407 U.S. at 525, State v. Hovt 806 P.2d 204,208 (UtApp.
1991).
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"Prejudice . . . should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three
such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last..."
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986)(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532,97 S.Ct. at 2193)
It is the last factor that weighs in heavily in Mr. Russell's case. Pursuant to U.C.A. §76-2401(1) and 402(1), a party may be justified in the use offeree if necessary to defend himself or
anotherfromphysical force. In Mr. Russell's case, no witnesses at trial other than Mr. Russell himself
could testify that Mr. Mavadattfirstused force against Mr. Russell. Although numerous persons at
a neighboring business witnessed Mr. Mavadatt's assault on Mr. Russell and could have testified that
Mr. Russell acted in self-defense, by the time the matter came to trial, indeed, effectively by the time
that Mr. Russell received the original information, there was no way that Mr. Russell could locate any
of those witnesses. As a result, he could not effectively present the defense of justification.

6
In addition, Deputy Spencer, who interviewed the Appellant at the scene, took no notes nor
did hefilea police report. At an earlier pretrial conference, Spencer admitted that didn't remember
the initial encounter with the Mr. Russell over the incident. Finally, Mr. Russell was unable to obtain
the dispatch tapes which would have supported his defense of justification, as the State had not
retained them. Mr. Russell was thus clearly and directly prejudiced by the delay, through nofeultof
his own. In addition to speedy trial concerns, such a pre-indictment delay violates a defendant's right
to due process if such delay results in actual prejudice. State v. Bvrns, 911 P.2d 981, 985, 986
(Ut.App. 1995). Clearly there has been such actual prejudice in this case.
CONCLUSION
The very essence ofthe right to a speedy trial is to prevent a defendantfrombeing prejudiced
in his ability to defend himself at trial. "The speedy trial right reserved under the Utah Constitution
is no greater or lesser than its federal counterpart." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325,1328 n.3 (Utah
1986). In this case, the State was given several bites at the apple by being granted repeated
continuances when its witnesses failed to show up for trial. At the same time, as a result of the long
delay between the alleged incident and trial, Appellant was unable to locate witnesses who would
have been critical to his defense ofjustification, as set forth under Utah law. The Appellant has met
the criteria set forth under Barker v. Wingo, and his conviction should therefore be overturned.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2000.

Michael L. Humiston
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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